๐—ฌ๐—”๐—Ÿ๐—ง๐—” ๐Ÿฎ.๐Ÿฌ? ๐—ง๐—ฅ๐—จ๐— ๐—ฃ ๐—ฆ๐—›๐—”๐—ง๐—ง๐—˜๐—ฅ๐—ฆ ๐—ก๐—˜๐—ช ๐—ฆ๐—ง๐—”๐—ฅ๐—ง ๐—”๐—ก๐—— ๐—ฅ๐—˜๐—ช๐—œ๐—ฅ๐—˜๐—ฆ ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ ๐—š๐—Ÿ๐—ข๐—•๐—”๐—Ÿ ๐—ก๐—จ๐—–๐—Ÿ๐—˜๐—”๐—ฅ ๐—ข๐—ฅ๐——๐—˜๐—ฅ

Eelaththu Nilavan
Tamil National Historian | Analyst of Global Politics, Economics, Intelligence & Military Affairs
08/02/2026

๐˜›๐˜ฉ๐˜ฆ ๐˜Œ๐˜ฏ๐˜ฅ ๐˜ฐ๐˜ง ๐˜ˆ๐˜ณ๐˜ฎ๐˜ด ๐˜Š๐˜ฐ๐˜ฏ๐˜ต๐˜ณ๐˜ฐ๐˜ญ ๐˜ข๐˜ฏ๐˜ฅ ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ๐˜ฆ ๐˜‰๐˜ช๐˜ณ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ ๐˜ฐ๐˜ง ๐˜ข ๐˜•๐˜ฆ๐˜ธ ๐˜•๐˜ถ๐˜ค๐˜ญ๐˜ฆ๐˜ข๐˜ณ ๐˜ˆ๐˜จ๐˜ฆ

โœฆ ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ ๐—™๐—œ๐—ก๐—”๐—Ÿ ๐—–๐—ข๐—Ÿ๐—Ÿ๐—”๐—ฃ๐—ฆ๐—˜ ๐—ข๐—™ ๐—ก๐—˜๐—ช ๐—ฆ๐—ง๐—”๐—ฅ๐—ง

Onย February 5, theย New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty)ย officially expired, bringing an end to theย last surviving nuclear arms control agreementย between the United States and Russia. For over a decade, the treaty functioned as the final guardrail restraining the worldโ€™s two largest nuclear arsenals, together accounting for nearlyย 90% of global nuclear weapons.

With its expiration:

โ€ข All legal caps on deployed strategic warheads are gone

โ€ข On-site inspections and data exchanges have ceased

โ€ข Transparency mechanisms have vanished overnight

This moment marks not merely the death of a treaty, but the collapse of the post-Cold War nuclear architecture itself.

โœฆ ๐—ง๐—ฅ๐—จ๐— ๐—ฃโ€™๐—ฆ ๐—–๐—”๐—Ÿ๐—–๐—จ๐—Ÿ๐—”๐—ง๐—˜๐—— ๐—ฅ๐—จ๐—ฃ๐—ง๐—จ๐—ฅ๐—˜

President Donald Trump rejected extending New START, arguing that it represents an outdated bilateral model ill-suited to modern strategic realities. Instead, Washington is pushing for a new framework written on U.S. terms, reflecting:

โ€ข Emerging technologies (hypersonic weapons, space warfare)

โ€ข Multipolar nuclear dynamics

โ€ข The rise of China as a strategic peer

Trumpโ€™s decision signals a clear doctrine:
โžฝ Arms control will no longer be about mutual restraint, but about strategic dominance.

This approach echoes Yalta-style power politics, where global order is reshaped not through consensusโ€”but through leverage.

โœฆ ๐— ๐—ข๐—ฆ๐—–๐—ข๐—ชโ€™๐—ฆ ๐—ฅ๐—˜๐—ฆ๐—ฃ๐—ข๐—ก๐—ฆ๐—˜: ๐—™๐—ฅ๐—ข๐—  ๐—ฅ๐—˜๐—š๐—ฅ๐—˜๐—ง ๐—ง๐—ข ๐—ฅ๐—˜๐—”๐—ฅ๐— ๐—”๐— ๐—˜๐—ก๐—ง

The Kremlin publicly expressed regret, noting it had proposed a one-year extension to preserve stability. Washingtonโ€™s refusal ended that possibility.

Russia has now declared:

โ€ข It is no longer bound by New START limits

โ€ข Nuclear force planning will proceed without legal constraints

โ€ข Strategic deterrence will be recalibrated for worst-case scenarios

This marks a decisive shift from managed rivalry to unrestricted strategic competition.

โœฆ ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ โ€œ๐—–๐—›๐—œ๐—ก๐—” ๐—™๐—”๐—–๐—ง๐—ข๐—ฅโ€ ๐—”๐—ก๐—— ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ ๐—˜๐—ก๐—— ๐—ข๐—™ ๐—•๐—œ๐—ฃ๐—ข๐—Ÿ๐—”๐—ฅ ๐—”๐—ฅ๐— ๐—ฆ ๐—–๐—ข๐—ก๐—ง๐—ฅ๐—ข๐—Ÿ

Washington insists that China must be included in any future arms control regime due to its rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal.

However:

โ€ข China has rejected formal trilateral negotiations

โ€ข Beijing argues its arsenal is still far smaller than U.S. and Russian stockpiles

โ€ข Inclusion would legitimize American nuclear superiority

The result is a strategic deadlockโ€”where no power wants to limit itself first, and mistrust replaces diplomacy.

โœฆ ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ ๐——๐—”๐—ก๐—š๐—˜๐—ฅ๐—ข๐—จ๐—ฆ ๐—”๐—™๐—ง๐—˜๐—ฅ๐— ๐—”๐—ง๐—›: ๐—” ๐—ช๐—ข๐—ฅ๐—Ÿ๐—— ๐—ช๐—œ๐—ง๐—›๐—ข๐—จ๐—ง ๐—ก๐—จ๐—–๐—Ÿ๐—˜๐—”๐—ฅ ๐—š๐—จ๐—”๐—ฅ๐——๐—ฅ๐—”๐—œ๐—Ÿ๐—ฆ

With New START gone, the world enters its most unstable nuclear phase since the 1960s.

Key Risks Include:

โ€ข โ– No inspections โ†’ no verification

โ€ข โ– No data sharing โ†’ strategic blind spots

โ€ข โ– No ceilings โ†’ quantitative arms races

โ€ข โ– Faster decision-making under uncertainty

In such an environment, miscalculation becomes as dangerous as intent.

โœฆ ๐—ฅ๐—จ๐—ฆ๐—ฆ๐—œ๐—”โ€™๐—ฆ ๐—ฆ-๐Ÿฑ๐Ÿฌ๐Ÿฌ ๐—ฃ๐—ฅ๐—ข๐— ๐—˜๐—ง๐—›๐—˜๐—จ๐—ฆ: ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ โ€œ๐—š๐—ข๐—Ÿ๐——๐—˜๐—ก ๐——๐—ข๐— ๐—˜โ€ ๐——๐—ข๐—–๐—ง๐—ฅ๐—œ๐—ก๐—˜

Against this backdrop, Russia has unveiled its most ambitious defensive system yetโ€”the S-500 Prometheus.

Operational Reality (Early 2026):

โ€ข First regiment fully operational since December 2025

โ€ข Designed by Almaz-Antey

โ€ข Initially deployed around Moscow, with plans for nationwide coverage

The S-500 represents a paradigm shiftโ€”from deterrence by retaliation to deterrence by denial.

โœฆ ๐—ง๐—˜๐—–๐—›๐—ก๐—œ๐—–๐—”๐—Ÿ ๐—ฆ๐—จ๐—ฃ๐—˜๐—ฅ๐—œ๐—ข๐—ฅ๐—œ๐—ง๐—ฌ ๐—ข๐—™ ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ ๐—ฆ-๐Ÿฑ๐Ÿฌ๐Ÿฌ

The system integrates air, missile, and space defense into a single battle network:

โ€ข Detection Range: Up to 600 km

โ€ข Engagement Range: 500โ€“600 km

โ€ข Altitude: Up to 200 km (near space)

โ€ข Interceptor Speed:Mach 10โ€“12

โ€ข Hypersonic Tracking: 10 targets simultaneously

โ€ข Targets:
โœ“ Ballistic missiles
โœ“ Cruise missiles
โœ“ Stealth aircraft (F-22, F-35)
โœ“ Drones
โœ“ Low-orbit satellites

This effectively blurs the boundary between air defense and space warfare.

โœฆ ๐—”๐—ก๐—ง๐—œ-๐—ฆ๐—”๐—ง๐—˜๐—Ÿ๐—Ÿ๐—œ๐—ง๐—˜ ๐—ช๐—”๐—ฅ๐—™๐—”๐—ฅ๐—˜ ๐—”๐—ก๐—— ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ ๐— ๐—œ๐—Ÿ๐—œ๐—ง๐—”๐—ฅ๐—œ๐—ญ๐—”๐—ง๐—œ๐—ข๐—ก ๐—ข๐—™ ๐—ฆ๐—ฃ๐—”๐—–๐—˜

Russian officials have openly acknowledged the S-500โ€™s anti-satellite capabilities, signaling a willingness to:

โ€ข Blind adversary ISR networks

โ€ข Disrupt command-and-control systems

โ€ข Paralyze NATOโ€™s space-dependent warfare doctrine

In a post-New START world, space becomes the next nuclear frontier.

โœฆ ๐— ๐—ข๐—ฆ๐—–๐—ข๐—ชโ€“๐—•๐—˜๐—œ๐—๐—œ๐—ก๐—š: ๐—” ๐—ก๐—˜๐—ช ๐—ฆ๐—ง๐—ฅ๐—”๐—ง๐—˜๐—š๐—œ๐—– ๐—”๐—ซ๐—œ๐—ฆ

As U.S.โ€“Russia relations deteriorate, Russia and China are tightening strategic coordination, including:

โ€ข Missile defense interoperability

โ€ข Nuclear signaling alignment

โ€ข Shared opposition to U.S.-led arms regimes

This emerging axis represents the end of Western monopoly over global nuclear rule-making.

โœฆ ๐—ฌ๐—”๐—Ÿ๐—ง๐—” ๐Ÿฎ.๐Ÿฌ: ๐—” ๐—ช๐—ข๐—ฅ๐—Ÿ๐—— ๐—ฅ๐—˜๐——๐—ฅ๐—”๐—ช๐—ก ๐—•๐—ฌ ๐—™๐—ข๐—ฅ๐—–๐—˜

Just as Yalta (1945) reshaped the post-World War II order, todayโ€™s collapse of New START signals a repartitioning of powerโ€”not through treaties, but through:

โ€ข Technological superiority

โ€ข Strategic coercion

โ€ข Nuclear posturing

The age of arms control is giving way to an age of raw deterrence.

โœฆ ๐—–๐—ข๐—ก๐—–๐—Ÿ๐—จ๐—ฆ๐—œ๐—ข๐—ก: ๐—” ๐— ๐—ข๐—ฅ๐—˜ ๐——๐—”๐—ก๐—š๐—˜๐—ฅ๐—ข๐—จ๐—ฆ ๐—ช๐—ข๐—ฅ๐—Ÿ๐——
The expiration of New START is not an isolated diplomatic failureโ€”it is a civilizational turning point.

Without rules, inspections, or trust:

โ€ข Nuclear weapons regain political centrality

โ€ข Defensive systems like the S-500 redefine deterrence

โ€ข Miscalculation becomes existential

The world has entered a post-arms-control era, where peace is no longer negotiatedโ€”but enforced.

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โœ’๏ธ

Eelaththu Nilavan
Tamil National Historian | Analyst of Global Politics, Economics, Intelligence & Military Affairs
08/02/2026

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